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This	   chapter	   examines	   the	   divergent	  means	   of	   imposing	   criminal	   responsibility	   for	  
corporate	  manslaughter	   in	   two	   comparable	   common	   law	   jurisdictions:	   Ireland	   and	  
England	  and	  Wales.	  First,	   it	  explores	   the	  methodological	   limitations	  of	  gauging	   the	  
true	  extent	  of	  work-­‐related	  fatalities	  in	  both	  jurisdictions	  and	  investigates,	  insofar	  as	  
is	   possible,	   the	   interplay	   between	   gender	   and	   workplace	   deaths	   across	   selected	  
member	   states	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   (EU).	   Secondly,	   the	   chapter	   traces	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  law	  of	  corporate	  manslaughter	  from	  the	  imposition	  of	  corporate	  
criminal	   liability	  via	   the	   common	   law	   “identification	  doctrine”	   to	   the	  proposals	   for	  
law	   reform	   in	   Ireland	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   direct	   corporate	   liability	   homicide	  
offence	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (UK).	  Thirdly,	  the	  chapter	  accepts	  the	  challenge	  set	  by	  
Jeremy	  Horder	  to	  take	  “the	  intellectual	  leap	  out	  of	  the	  Marxist	  moral-­‐political	  rut	  in	  
which	   corporate	  manslaughter	   scholarship	   has	   largely	   been	   stuck”	   and	   explores	   a	  
provision	  of	   the	  Corporate	  Manslaughter	  and	  Corporate	  Homicide	  Act	  2007,	  which	  
has	  been	  neglected	  by	  criminologists	  and	  criminal	   law	  scholars	  –	  the	  application	  of	  
the	  legislation	  to	  deaths	  to	  custody	  –	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  Act,	  which	  was	  unsurprisingly	  
very	   controversial	   at	   the	   time	   (Horder,	   2012:	   116).	   Building	   on	   the	   literature	   that	  
examines	   the	  applicability	  of	   the	  2007	   legislation	   to	  National	  Health	  Service	  Trusts	  
(Horder,	   2012)	   and	   to	   the	  police	   (Griffin	   and	  Moran,	   2010),	   this	   chapter	  opens	  up	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this	   area	   of	   inquiry	   in	   a	   context	   where	   it	   has	   hitherto	   been	   unexplored	   and	  
investigates	  the	  potential	  liability	  of	  HM	  Prison	  Service	  (HMPS)	  as	  an	  organisational	  
body	  in	  light	  of	  the	  statute.	  	  
	  
Work-­‐Related	  Fatalities	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  
	  
Homicide	  (whether	  murder,	  manslaughter	  or	  infanticide)	  is	  one	  class	  of	  violent	  crime	  
where	   the	   contemporary	   police	   figures	   in	   Ireland	   and	   the	   UK	   are	   considered	   to	  
provide	  a	  reasonably	  accurate	  count	  (Office	  for	  National	  Statistics,	  2015:	  27).	  As	  Ian	  
O’Donnell	  observes,	  it	  would	  be	  wholly	  exceptional	  for	  an	  unlawful	  death	  not	  to	  be	  
thoroughly	   investigated	   or	   not	   to	   be	   contained	   in	   the	   official	   figures	   (O’Donnell,	  
2002).	  The	  limitations	  of	  crime	  statistics	  more	  generally	  have	  been	  well	  documented,	  
but	   the	   interpretation	   of	   workplace	   fatality	   statistics	   is	   also	   laden	   with	  
methodological	   difficulties	   (Almond,	   2013:	   11-­‐14).	   Although	  work-­‐related	   fatalities	  
do	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   under-­‐reporting	   issues	   as	   non-­‐fatal	  
accidents	   in	   the	   workplace,	   it	   can	   be	   stated	   with	   some	   confidence	   that	   the	   true	  
extent	  of	  work-­‐related	  deaths	   is	  not	  reflected	   in	  the	  official	  statistics.	  For	   instance,	  
deaths	  resulting	  from	  work-­‐related	  road	  traffic	  collisions	  and	  long-­‐term	  occupational	  
illnesses	  such	  as	  cancer	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  fatality	  statistics	  in	  Ireland	  and	  the	  UK	  
(Drummond,	   2007;	   2008;	   HSE,	   2015).	   Attributing	   chronic	   illnesses	   and	   deaths	   to	  
occupational	  exposure	   is	  almost	   impossible	  given	  the	  genuine	  difficulties	  with	  case	  
identification	  –	  “diseases	  processes	  are	  often	  complex,	  multi-­‐causal	  and	  can	  have	  a	  
long	  latency	  period”	  (Russell	  et	  al.,	  2015:	  21)	  −	  but	  work-­‐related	  road	  traffic	  deaths	  
are	   also	   difficult	   to	   quantify	   due	   to	   limitations	   in	   data	   collection	   systems	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(Drummond,	  2007:	  6).	  This	  is	  so	  even	  though	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  indicates	  
that	   road	   traffic	   fatalities	   contribute	   significantly	   to,	   and	   in	   certain	   common	   law	  
jurisdictions,	  comprise	  the	  largest	  single	  category	  of	  work-­‐related	  injury	  deaths	  (25).	  
It	  thus	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  surmise	  that	  the	  range	  of	  work-­‐related	  deaths	  that	  come	  
to	  the	  attention	  of	   the	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Executive	  (Britain)	  and	  Health	  and	  Safety	  
Authority	   (Ireland)	   only	   provide	   “a	   consistent	   record	   of	   a	   subset	   of	   work-­‐related	  
injuries	  and	  deaths”	  (Russell	  et	  al,	  2015:	  21).	  	  
	  
Yet	   despite	   these	   limitations,	   the	   “official”	   figures	   reveal	   that	   there	   are	   almost	   as	  
many	  workplace	   deaths	   as	   homicides	   in	   Ireland	   annually	   (Kilcommins	  et	   al.,	   2004:	  
130).	  “Sadly”,	  as	   the	  Chief	  Executive	  of	   the	   Irish	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Authority	   (HSA)	  
pointed	   out,	   “there	   were	   48	   work-­‐related	   deaths	   in	   2012”	   (HSA,	   2012:	   3),	   while	  
there	  were	  sixty	  cases	  of	  murder	  and	  manslaughter	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  This,	  of	  course,	  
is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  all	  workplace	  deaths	  can	  be	  attributable	  to	  employers	  breaking	  
the	  law,	  but	  it	  does	  appear	  that	  Irish	  citizens	  are	  almost	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  “wounded	  or	  
killed	  at	  work,	  sometimes	  because	  their	  employer	  has	  broken	  the	  law,	  than	  they	  are	  
to	   be	   attacked	   and	   harmed	   by	   a	   stranger”	   (Kilcommins	   et	   al.,	   2004:	   130).	  
Furthermore,	  while	  at	   least	   there	   is	  some	  possibility	   that	  such	  an	  assailant	  may	  be	  
detected	   and	   prosecuted,	   “[there]	   has	   never	   been	   a	   prosecution	   of	   a	   corporate	  
entity	  for	  manslaughter	  in	  Ireland”	  (LRC,	  2005:	  4).	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  there	  is	  still	  
no	  Corporate	  Manslaughter	   legislation	  on	   the	   Irish	   statute	  book,	  although	   the	  Law	  
Reform	  Commission	  has	  recommended	  its	  introduction	  (Carolan,	  2011:	  157-­‐174)	  and	  
the	  latest	  of	  a	  series	  of	  private	  members’	  bills	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  Seanad	  in	  June	  
2013.	  By	  contrast,	  an	  entirely	  new	  homicide	  offence	  that	  can	  only	  be	  committed	  by	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organisations	  was	  enacted	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  2007.	  This	  direct	  corporate	  liability	  homicide	  
offence	  marked	   the	   abandonment	  of	   the	   identification	  principle	   as	   the	  method	  of	  
attributing	  liability	  to	  companies	  and	  organisations	  who	  may	  now	  be	  held	  criminally	  
responsible	   for	   “unlawful	   homicide	   where	   previously	   there	   was	   no	   unlawful	  
homicide	   and	   no	   homicide	   offence	   committed	   by	   anyone”	   (Ormerod	   and	   Taylor,	  
2008:	  591).	  The	  UK	  is	  not	  the	  only	  jurisdiction	  to	  create	  a	  specific	  homicide	  offence	  
for	  corporations	  that	  cause	  death	  –	  the	  Australian	  Capital	  Territory	  (ACT)	  introduced	  
an	  offence	  of	  this	  type	  in	  2003	  –	  but	  the	  legislative	  act	  of	  passing	  an	  offence	  into	  law	  
does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   the	   provision	   will	   be	   implemented	   in	   practice	  
(Almond,	   2013:	   35-­‐37).	   There	   were,	   for	   instance,	   only	   6	   offences	   of	   corporate	  
manslaughter	   recorded	   in	   England	   and	   Wales	   in	   the	   four-­‐year	   period	   after	   the	  
legislation	   came	   into	   force	   in	   April	   2008	   (Office	   for	  National	   Statistics,	   2012).	   This	  
chasm	   is	   particularly	   apparent	   when	   the	   police	   statistics	   are	   juxtaposed	   with	   the	  
workplace	  fatality	  statistics.	  To	  put	  it	  otherwise,	  there	  were	  114	  fatal	  injuries	  in	  the	  
workplace	   between	  March	   2011	   and	   April	   2012,	   but	   there	  were	   only	   2	   corporate	  
manslaughter	  offences	   recorded	   in	   the	   same	  12-­‐month	  period	   (Office	   for	  National	  
Statistics,	  2012).	  By	  contrast,	  there	  were	  almost	  five	  times	  as	  many	  homicides	  in	  the	  
UK	  as	  deaths	  in	  the	  workplace	  (550	  and	  114	  respectively),	  although	  it	  would	  appear	  
to	   be	   stretching	   credulity	   to	   suggest	   that	   only	   two	  of	   these	  work-­‐related	   fatalities	  
were	   the	  outcome	  of	  gross	  negligence	  or	  blatant	   law	  breaking	   (Office	   for	  National	  
Statistics,	  2012).	  
	  
The	   examination	   of	   national	   data	   comparability	   on	   accidents	   at	   work	   also	   poses	  
serious	  methodological	  challenges	  (Brenner	  and	  Hopkins,	  2006:	  10-­‐12).	  International	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comparisons	  are	  fraught	  with	  difficulty	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  definitions	  of	  workplace	  
accidents	  and	  reporting	  systems	   inter	  alia,	  but	  some	  basic	   insights	  can	  be	  attained	  
from	  the	  European	  Statistics	  on	  Accidents	  at	  Work	  (ESAW)	  collected	  by	  the	  Statistical	  
Office	  of	  the	  EU,	  Eurostat	  (HSE,	  2015:	  7-­‐8).	  Similar	  to	  the	  steady	  overall	  reduction	  in	  
work-­‐related	  deaths	  across	  the	  EU,	  the	  reports	  of	  the	  HSA	  and	  the	  HSE	  illustrate	  that	  
there	  has	  been	  a	  downward	  trend	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  work-­‐related	  fatality	  in	  Ireland	  and	  
the	  UK	   in	   the	   period	   1998-­‐2013,	   although	   the	   decline	   has	   become	   somewhat	   less	  
pronounced	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  more	  recent	  years	  (HSE,	  2015:	  2;	  Russell	  et	  al.,	  2015:	  72).	  
Yet	   despite	   the	   decrease	   in	   the	   number	   of	   reported	  workplace	   fatalities	   between	  
1998	   and	   2013,	   Ireland	   had	   the	   eight	   highest	   workplace	   fatality	   rate	   in	   the	   EU15	  
Countries	   in	   2012,	   with	   more	   than	   twice	   the	   UK	   rate	   of	   workplace	   fatalities	   per	  
100,000	  workers	  (Eurostat,	  2012).	  The	  standardised	  fatality	   incidence	  rates	   in	  2012	  
vary	  significantly	  among	  the	  EU15	  civil	  law	  jurisdictions	  ranging	  between	  0.72	  in	  the	  
Netherlands	  and	  2.71	  in	  Portugal.	  Other	  civil	  law	  jurisdictions	  such	  as	  Sweden	  (0.80),	  
Germany	  (0.90)	  and	  Denmark	  (1.18)	  also	  have	  low	  fatality	  rates,	  while	  the	  Irish	  rate	  
(1.43)	   remains	   relatively	  stable,	  hovering	   just	  above	  the	  national	  EU15	  average.	  By	  
contrast,	   the	   standardised	   incidence	   rate	   for	   the	   UK	   (0.58	   per	   100,000)	   was	  
considerably	   lower	  than	  the	  corresponding	  EU15	  rate	  (1.3)	  and	  that	  of	  many	  other	  
EU	   member	   states,	   including	   Italy	   (1.29),	   Spain	   (1.99)	   and	   France	   (2.64).	   Table	   1	  
shows	  the	  latest	  standardised	  rates	  of	  fatal	  accidents	  at	  work	  published	  by	  Eurostat.	  	  	  
	  
[Insert	  Table	  1]	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What	  is	  also	  clear	  from	  the	  Eurostat	  data	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  gender	  difference	  
in	  the	  standardised	  fatality	  incidence	  rates.	  The	  2012	  statistics	  reveal	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  
fatal	   accidents	   is	   quite	   unequal	   between	   males	   and	   females	   across	   the	   EU15	  
countries	  and	  that	  the	  female	  fatality	  rate	  is	  relatively	  low	  (0.12	  per	  100,000	  workers	  
in	   2012)	  when	   compared	   to	   the	  male	   fatality	   rate	   (2.02	   per	   100,000	  workers).	   All	  
told,	  there	  were	  1402	  fatal	  accidents	  recorded	  in	  the	  EU15	  countries	  in	  2012,	  48	  of	  
which	  were	  female	  fatalities.	  It	  is	  evident,	  therefore,	  from	  this	  succinct	  analysis	  that	  
the	   problem	   of	   (reported)	   workplace	   fatalities	   in	   the	   EU15	   countries	   is	  
predominately	   a	   male	   one	   with	   the	   available	   statistical	   evidence	   revealing	   that	  
women	  were	   less	   likely	  than	  men	  to	  die	  at	  work.	  Of	  course,	  this	  disparity	  between	  
the	   sexes	   is	   partially	   explained	   by	   “employment	   patterns	   within	   occupations	   and	  
industries”,	  but	   it	  does	  appear	  that	  this	   is	  not	  a	  uniquely	  European	  trend	  (Hoskins,	  
2005:	  37;	  BLS,	  1994-­‐2013).	  	  	  
	  
Attributing	  Corporate	  Criminal	  Responsibility	  in	  Britain	  and	  Ireland	  	  
	  
Although	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  clamour	  to	  criminalise	  organisations	  who	  are	  in	  some	  
way	  responsible	  for	  workplace	  deaths,	  the	  criminal	   law	  was	  “developed	  with	  flesh-­‐
and-­‐blood	   human	   beings	   in	  mind”	   so	   offences,	   and	   serious	   offences	   in	   particular,	  
generally	   require	   both	   an	   illegal	   conduct	   element	   (actus	   reus)	   and	   a	   “guilty	  mind”	  
element	   (mens	  rea)	   (Gobert,	  2008b:	  61).	  As	  companies	  do	  not	  have	  minds	  of	   their	  
own,	  the	  law	  has	  struggled	  to	  find	  coherent,	  consistent	  and	  fair	  methods	  to	  ascribe	  
fault	   to	   companies	   (Gobert,	   1994:	   393;	  Wells,	   2001:	   86-­‐99).	   Criminal	   liability	  may,	  
however,	   be	   imposed	   via	   the	   identification	   doctrine	   where	   a	   sufficiently	   senior	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manager,	  the	  “directing	  mind	  and	  will”	  of	  the	  company,	  has	  perpetrated	  the	  crime	  
or	   bears	   responsibility	   for	   the	   crime.	   In	   Lennard’s	   Carrying	   Co.	   Ltd	   v	   Asiatic	  
Petroleum	  Co.	  Ltd	  ([1915]	  AC	  705:	  713),	  a	  case	  concerning	  civil	  liability	  under	  statute	  
for	  goods	   lost	  at	  sea,	  Lord	  Haldane	  LC	  noted	  the	  difficulties	  of	   locating	  a	  “directing	  
mind”	   in	   a	   company,	   stating	   “its	   active	   and	   directing	   will	   must	   consequently	   be	  
sought	  in	  the	  person	  of	  somebody	  who	  for	  some	  purposes	  may	  be	  called	  an	  agent,	  
but	  who	   is	   really	   the	  directing	  mind	  and	  will	   of	   the	   corporation,	   the	   very	   ego	  and	  
centre	  of	  the	  personality	  of	  the	  corporation”.	  In	  HL	  Bolton	  (Engineering)	  Co.	  Ltd	  v	  TJ	  
Graham	  &	  Sons	  Ltd	  ([1957]	  1	  QB	  159),	  concerning	  a	  statutory	  entitlement	  to	  renew	  a	  
lease,	  Lord	  Denning	  developed	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  doctrine	  by	  analogising	  the	  company	  
with	  a	  human.	  He	  noted	  (172)	  that	  servants	  and	  agents	  are	  merely	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
company	   but	   the	   directors	   and	   managers	   are	   the	   brains	   of	   the	   company	   “who	  
represent	  the	  directing	  mind	  and	  will	  of	  the	  company,	  and	  control	  what	  it	  does.	  The	  
state	  of	  mind	  of	  these	  managers	  is	  the	  state	  of	  mind	  of	  the	  company	  and	  is	  treated	  
by	  the	  law	  as	  such”.	  
	  
These	   dicta	   were	   subsequently	   cited	   in	   Tesco	   v	   Nattrass	   ([1972]	   AC	   153),	   a	  
prosecution	   for	   false	  advertising.	   Lord	  Diplock	   (199)	  noted	   that	   the	   company	   itself	  
may	   set	   out	   who	   acts	   as	   the	   directing	   mind	   and	   will	   of	   the	   company	   in	   its	  
memorandum	  of	  association,	  though	  the	  actions	  of	  its	  board	  of	  directors,	  or	  through	  
its	  shareholders	  at	  the	  general	  meeting.	  Viscount	  Dilhorne	  (187)	  stated	  that	  such	  a	  
person	  or	  persons	  would	  have	  “actual	  control”	  of	  the	  company	  or	  some	  of	  its	  actions	  
though	   exactly	   who	   constitutes	   the	   directing	   mind	   and	   will	   of	   a	   company	   would	  
naturally	  vary	  from	  company	  to	  company.	  Lord	  Reid	  (171)	  noted	  that	  these	  persons	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include	  the	  directors,	  the	  managing	  director,	  and	  senior	  officers	  of	  the	  company	  who	  
“carry	  out	  the	  functions	  of	  management	  and	  speak	  and	  act	  as	  the	  company”	  but	  that	  
this	  would	  generally	  exclude	  “subordinate”	  officers	  because	  “they	  carry	  out	  orders	  
from	   above	   and	   it	   can	   make	   no	   difference	   that	   they	   are	   given	   some	  measure	   of	  
discretion”.	  
	  
The	   identification	   doctrine	   has	   been	   successfully	   invoked	   to	   prosecute	   small	  
companies	  or	  “one-­‐man”	  companies,	  where	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  company	  are	  easy	  to	  
associate	  with	  the	  manager.	  For	  example,	  in	  R	  v	  Kite	  and	  OLL	  Ltd	  ([1996]	  2	  Cr.	  App.	  
R.(S.)	   295),	   a	   small	   company	   with	   an	   uncomplicated	   management	   system	   was	  
convicted	  of	  the	  deaths	  of	  four	  school	  children	  who	  drowned	  in	  a	  canoeing	  accident	  
because	   its	  managing	   director	   knew	   the	   safety	   systems	   in	   place	  were	   inadequate	  
(McShee,	  2008:	  12).	  Similarly,	  in	  R	  v	  Jackson	  Transport	  (Osset)	  Ltd	  (Health	  and	  Safety	  
Bulletin,	  November	  1996),	  the	  one-­‐director	  company	  was	  convicted	  of	  manslaughter	  
because	  it	  had	  not	  provided	  equipment	  and	  training	  to	  an	  employee	  who	  died	  when	  
sprayed	  with	   toxic	   chemicals	  while	   cleaning	   a	   tanker.	   It	   has,	   however,	   been	  more	  
difficult	  to	  successfully	  prosecute	  larger	  companies,	  with	  more	  complex	  systems	  for	  
organising	  responsibility	  (Sealy	  and	  Worthington,	  2010:	  145).	  	  
	  
In	   R	   v	   P&O	   Ferries	   ([1991]	   93	   Cr.	   App.	   R.	   72),	   the	   company	   was	   acquitted	   of	  
corporate	  manslaughter	  when	  one	  of	  its	  ferries	  capsized	  while	  sailing	  with	  its	  doors	  
open,	   killing	   193	   people,	   because	   none	   of	   the	   other	   natural	   defendants	   facing	  
manslaughter	   charges	   could	   be	   identified	   as	   the	   controlling	   mind	   and	   will	   of	   the	  
company.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  despite	  a	  previous	  inquiry	  conducted	  by	  Sheen	  J	  which	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concluded,	   “all	   concerned	   in	   the	  management,	   from	   the	  members	  of	   the	  Board	  of	  
Directors	  down	  to	  the	  junior	  superintendents,	  were	  guilty	  of	  fault	  in	  that	  all	  must	  be	  
regarded	   as	   sharing	   responsibility	   for	   the	   failure	   of	   management.	   From	   top	   to	  
bottom	  the	  body	  corporate	  was	  infected	  by	  the	  disease	  of	  sloppiness”	  (Department	  
of	   Transport,	   1987:	   14).	   Similarly,	   in	  Attorney-­‐General’s	   Reference	   (No	   2	   of	   1999)	  
([2000]	  2	  Cr	  App	  R	  207),	  a	   large	  company	  employing	  2,700	  people	  was	  prosecuted	  
for	  manslaughter	  when	  a	  high-­‐speed	   train	  and	  a	   freight	   train	   collided	  killing	   seven	  
passengers.	  The	  company	  had	  allowed	  the	  trains	  to	  operate	  with	  the	  safety	  systems	  
turned	  off	  but	  it	  was	  acquitted	  because	  no	  specific	  “directing	  mind”	  could	  be	  found	  
liable	  for	  manslaughter.	  
	  
Convictions	   for	  manslaughter	  against	   large	  companies	  are	  hard	  to	  achieve	  because	  
their	   organisational	   structures,	   their	   internal	   lines	   of	   decision	   making	   and	  
accountability,	   the	  geographical	   scope	  of	   their	  operations	  and	   the	  nature,	   volume,	  
complexity	   of	   their	   transactions,	   can	   all	   give	   rise	   to	   ambiguities	   such	   that	  
responsibility	  can	  become	  diffused	  and	  fragmented	  throughout	  these	  organisations	  
(Wolgast,	  1992;	  Minkes	  and	  Minkes,	  2008).	  In	  large	  corporations,	  for	  example,	  senior	  
managers	  cannot	  be	  involved	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  daily	  business	  of	  the	  company	  so	  
they	  set	  policies	  that	  are	   implemented	  by	   lower-­‐level	  officers.	  This	  can	  mean,	  “the	  
subordinate	   has	   worked	   out	   all	   the	   details	   of	   the	   boss’s	   predetermined	   solution,	  
without	  the	  boss	  being	  specifically	  aware	  of	  all	  the	  eggs	  that	  have	  to	  be	  broken”,	  a	  
solution	   that	   “relieves	   superiors	   of	   too	   much	   knowledge,	   particularly	   guilty	  
knowledge”	  (Jackall,	  1988:	  20).	  This	  may	  insulate	  managers	  from	  the	  criminal	  actions	  
of	   subordinates,	   so	   that	   “a	  business	   inevitability	   is	   converted	   into	  a	   legal	  defence”	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(Gobert,	  1994:	  401).	  	  
	  
As	  regards	  the	  Irish	  jurisprudence,	  Horan	  (2001:	  30)	  notes	  that	  “there	  is	  an	  absence	  
of	  comprehensive	  judicial	  scrutiny	  in	  this	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  identification	  doctrine”,	  
though	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  civil	  cases	  which	   identify	  the	  actions	  of	  corporations	  
with	  their	  senior	  officers.	  In	  R	  v	  Justices	  of	  County	  Cork	  ([1906]	  2	  IR	  415),	  concerning	  
an	   application	   for	   a	   beer	   dealing	   licence	   by	   Beamish	   &	   Crawford	   Ltd,	   it	   was	  
suggested	   the	   acts,	   omissions,	   and	   reputation	   of	   the	   company	   could	   be	   inferred	  
through	   that	   of	   its	  management.	   In	   Taylor	   v	   Smith	   ([1991]	   1	   IR	   142:	   166),	   a	   case	  
concerning	  whether	   a	   company	   could	   commit	   conspiracy	  with	   its	   “sole	   controlling	  
agent	  and	  mind	  of	  the	  company”,	  McCarthy	  J	  cited	  with	  approval	  Viscount	  Haldane	  
LC	  in	  Lennard’s,	  noting	  that	  the	  company	  acts	  through	  natural	  persons	  that	  are	  the	  
directing	  mind	   and	  will	   of	   the	   company.	   In	  Superwood	  Holdings	   plc	   v	   Sun	  Alliance	  
and	   London	   Insurance	   plc	   [1995]	   3	   IR	   303),	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   determined	   that	   a	  
company	  could	  potentially	  be	  civilly	  liable	  for	  insurance	  fraud	  where	  it	  was	  possible	  
to	   identify	   that	   the	  directing	  mind	  and	  will	   of	   the	   company	  was	   responsible	   for	   it.	  
While	   noting	   Ussher’s	   (1986:	   38)	   warning	   that	   “attempts	   to	   relate	   parts	   of	   an	  
organisation	   to	   corresponding	   parts	   of	   the	   human	  body	  was	   a	  medieval	   pastime”,	  
Denham	  J	  (330)	  cited	  and	  accepted	  the	  directing	  mind	  test	  in	  Lennard’s	  Carrying	  Co.	  
Ltd	  noting	  that	  “the	  appropriate	  test	  is	  to	  apply	  the	  essential	  principle	  expounded	  by	  
Lord	  Haldane	  to	  an	  Irish	  company	  in	  a	  practical	  manner	  and	  determine	  who	  was	  in	  
control	  of	  the	  relevant	  issue.”	  In	  Howard	  v	  Irish	  Life	  &	  Permanent	  ([2006]	  IEHC	  419),	  
a	  case	  concerning	  an	  order	  for	  costs	  sought	  by	  the	  Revenue	  Commissioners,	  the	  case	  
law	   on	   the	   identification	   test	   is	   not	   cited	   but	   O’Sullivan	   J	   appeared	   to	   accept	   the	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principle,	  stating,	  “it	  would	  be	  unfair	  if,	  for	  example,	  knowledge	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  
an	   employee	   of	   a	   branch	   of	   the	   respondents	   were	   to	   be	   imputed	   in	   the	   present	  
context	  to	  the	  respondent	  itself	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  evidence	  that	  this	  knowledge	  
constituted	  the	  directing	  mind	  and	  will	  of	  the	  respondent”.	  
	  
Drawing	  these	  threads	  together,	  the	  current	  status	  of	  the	   identification	  doctrine	   in	  
criminal	   cases	   is	   unclear	   in	   Ireland.	   Horan	   (2011:	   33)	   cautions,	   “the	   decisions	   in	  
Howard,	   Superwood	   and	   Taylor	   were	   not	   concerned	   with	   criminal	   liability	   and	  
accordingly	   these	   precedents	   are	   not	   necessarily	   authorities	   in	   support	   of	   the	  
identification	   doctrine	   in	   the	   context	   of	   corporate	   criminal	   liability	   nor	   do	   they	  
preclude	  the	  option	  of	  the	  attribution	  doctrine”.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  of	  note	  that	  the	  
identification	  doctrine	  has	  been	  endorsed	   in	  civil	   cases	   in	   Ireland	  and	  a	  number	  of	  
English	  authorities	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  doctrine	  is	  applied	  in	  criminal	  and	  civil	  
law	   in	   the	   same	   way	   because	   it	   “has	   been	   developed	   with,	   no	   divergence	   of	  
approach,	   in	   both	   civil	   and	   criminal	   jurisdictions,	   the	   authorities	   being	   cited	  
indifferently	   in	   the	   other”	   (El	   Ajou	   v	  Dollar	   Land	  Holdings	   plc	   [1994]	   2	  All	   ER	   685;	  
Meridian	  Global	   Funds	  Management	  Asia	   Ltd	   v	   Securities	   Commission	   [1995]	   2	  AC	  
500).	  
	  
More	   recently,	   in	   Meridian	   Global	   Funds	   Management	   Asia	   Ltd	   v	   Securities	  
Commission	   ([1995]	   2	   AC	   500),	   the	   Privy	   Council	   seems	   to	   have	   taken	   a	   broader	  
approach	   to	   attributing	   criminal	   liability	   to	   companies	   in	   a	   case	   concerning	   the	  
failure	  to	  register	  the	  purchase	  of	  securities	  as	  required	  by	  statute	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  	  
The	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   determined	   that	   the	   rules	   by	   which	   acts	   are	   attributed	   to	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companies,	   the	   rules	   of	   attribution,	   are	   determined	   by	   the	   specifics	   of	   the	  
companies	  constitution,	  the	  rules	   implied	  by	  company	  law,	  the	  rules	  of	  agency	  and	  
vicarious	   liability.	   However,	   these	   rules	   may	   not	   always	   provide	   comprehensive	  
instructions	  so	  the	  court	  “must	  fashion	  a	  special	  rule	  of	  attribution	  for	  the	  particular	  
substantive	  rule	  .	   .	   .	  [to	  determine]	  whose	  act	  (or	  knowledge	  or	  state	  of	  mind)	  was	  
for	  this	  purpose	  intended	  to	  count	  as	  the	  act	  etc.	  of	  the	  company”	  (507).	  The	  court	  
concluded	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   substantive	   rule	   in	   this	   instance	  was	   to	   ensure	  
immediate	  disclosure,	  in	  fast	  moving	  markets,	  of	  the	  identities	  of	  those	  buying	  large	  
volumes	  of	  shares	  in	  public	  issuers.	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  law	  being	  frustrated,	  the	  
court	  could	   infer	   intention	  to	  the	  company	  from	  the	  person	  authorised	  to	  perform	  
the	   transaction,	  even	   if	  he	  was	  not	   the	  directing	  mind	  and	  will	  of	   the	  corporation.	  
Otherwise	   the	   company	   would	   not	   have	   to	   report	   these	   transactions	   until	   senior	  
management	  were	  aware	  of	   them	  and	  that	  “would	  place	  a	  premium	  on	  the	  board	  
paying	  as	   little	  attention	  as	  possible	   to	  what	   its	   investment	  managers	  were	  doing”	  
(511).	  
	  
This	  broader	  approach,	  which	  has	  proven	  popular	  in	  other	  common	  law	  jurisdictions	  
(Forlin	   and	   Smail,	   2013:	   502),	   was	   sharply	   circumscribed	   in	  Re	   Attorney	   General’s	  
Reference	  (No.	  2	  of	  1999)	  ([2000]	  2	  Cr	  App	  R	  207).	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  determined	  
that	   the	   identification	  doctrine	  was	   the	  only	  appropriate	   test	   for	  ascribing	  criminal	  
liability	  for	  gross	  negligent	  manslaughter	  to	  companies.	  The	  directing	  mind	  and	  will	  
of	  the	  company	  had	  to	  have	  been	  grossly	  criminally	  negligent	  as	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  to	  
criminal	   liability.	   Rose	   LJ	   (211)	   explained	   that	   the	   identification	   theory	   “was	  
developed	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  injustice:	   it	  would	  bring	  the	  law	  into	  disrepute	  if	  every	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act	  and	  state	  of	  mind	  of	  an	  individual	  employee	  was	  attributed	  to	  a	  company	  which	  
was	   entirely	   blameless”.	   The	   broader	   approach	   taken	   in	   Meridian,	   when	   it	   was	  
required,	   was	   only	   appropriate	   for	   statutory	   offences	   that	   would	   otherwise	   be	  
frustrated	  and	  identification	  remained	  the	  appropriate	  doctrine	  for	  ascribing	  liability	  
for	  common	   law	  offences.	  This	  was	   the	  view	  of	   the	  court	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
identification	   doctrine	   was	   originally	   developed	   to	   address	   statutory	   offences	  
(Gobert	  and	  Punch,	  2003:	  69).	  
	  
Similarly,	   in	   St.	   Regis	   Paper	   Co.	   Ltd	   v	   The	   Crown	   ([2012]	   1	   Cr.	   App.	   R.	   14),	   a	  
prosecution	   for	   filing	   false	   environmental	   pollution	   reports,	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	  
applied	   the	   stricter	   identification	   doctrine	   detailed	   in	   Tesco.	   It	   determined	   that	   it	  
was	  not	  necessary	   to	  relax	   the	  approach	   in	  Tesco	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	  “emasculating”	  
the	   legislation,	   noting	   that	   the	   company	   had	   already	   been	   convicted	   on	   fourteen	  
counts	   of	   strict	   liability	   offences	   (184).	   Moses	   LJ	   (185)	   determined	   that	   the	  
“conventional	   approach”	   was	   to	   apply	   Tesco	   and	   ask	   whether	   the	   Technical	   and	  
Environmental	  Manager,	  was	  “in	  actual	  control	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  company	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  submission	  of	  records	  and	  not	  responsible	  to	  another	  person	  for	  the	  
manner	   in	  which	   he	   discharged	   his	   duties	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   under	   that	   other	  
person’s	   orders?”	   As	   this	   manager	   reported	   to	   numerous	   layers	   of	   management	  
above	   him,	   and	   acted	   in	   defiance	   of	   the	   companies	   clear	   environmental	   policy	  
standards,	  the	  court	  determined	  that	  he	  did	  not	  fall	  “within	  the	  category	  described	  
by	  Viscount	  Dilhorne	  as	  someone	  who	  was	   in	  actual	  control	  of	   the	  operations	  of	  a	  
company	  or	  part	  of	  them	  and	  not	  responsible	  to	  another	  person	  in	  the	  company	  for	  
the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  were	  discharged”	  (185).	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It	  is	  difficult	  to	  state	  with	  complete	  certainty	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  identification	  principle	  
in	   Tesco	   or	   the	   attribution	   principle	   in	   Meridian	   that	   ought	   to	   apply,	   not	   only	  
because	   Meridian	   may	   only	   apply	   to	   statutory	   offences,	   but	   also	   because	   its	  
application	   seems	   to	   turn	  on	   the	   statute	  being	   interpreted	   (Ashworth,	   2009:	  150).	  
The	  impact	  of	  the	  wider	  Meridian	  approach	  in	  Ireland	  is	  also	  still	  unclear,	  though	  it	  
has	   been	   referenced	   briefly	   in	   a	   number	   of	   Irish	   cases.	   In	  Crofter	   Properties	   Ltd	   v	  
Genport	  Ltd	   ([2002]	  IEHC	  26),	  McCracken	  J	  cites	  the	  rules	  of	  attribution	  detailed	  by	  
Hoffman	  LJ	  in	  Meridian	  and	  though	  the	  parties	  seemed	  to	  accept	  them,	  the	  Court	  did	  
not	  actually	  consider	   the	   issue	   in	   further	  detail.	   In	  Fyffes	  v	  DCC	   [2009]	  2	   IR	  417],	  a	  
civil	   action	   for	   insider	  dealing,	   Laffoy	   J	   cited	  Viscount	  Haldane	   LC	   in	  Lennard’s	   and	  
noted	   that	   it	   was	   applied	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Superwood.	   She	   further	   cited	  
Hoffman	  in	  Meridian	  noting	  that	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  application	  of	  the	  directing	  mind	  
and	  will	  test	  would	  defeat	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  substantive	  rule,	  that	  the	  court	  could	  
fashion	   special	   rules	   attributing	   intent	   to	   companies.	   However,	   specific	   statutory	  
provisions	   determined	   the	   attribution	   of	   liability	   in	   this	   case	   so	  Meridian	   was	   not	  
applied.	  	  
	  
Gross	  Negligence	  Manslaughter	  	  
	  
Companies	   cannot	   form	   subjective	   intent	   or	   be	   subject	   to	   the	   mandatory	   life	  
sentence	   in	  prison,	   so	   companies	   cannot	   commit	   the	  offence	  of	  murder	   in	   English	  
and	   Irish	   law	   (Wells,	   2001:	   109;	   LRC,	   2003:	   89-­‐90).	   By	   contrast,	   companies	   may	  
commit	   gross	   negligence	   manslaughter	   at	   common	   law.	   The	   House	   of	   Lords	   laid	  
down	  the	  test	  for	  gross	  negligence	  manslaughter	  in	  R	  v	  Adomako	  ([1995]	  1	  AC	  171).	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In	   that	   case,	   an	  anesthetist	  did	  not	  notice	   that	   the	   tube	   from	  a	  ventilator	  became	  
dislodged	  during	   eye	   surgery	   causing	   the	  patient	   to	  have	   a	   cardiac	   arrest	   and	  die.	  
Lord	   Mackay	   determined	   that	   the	   jury	   could	   make	   a	   determination	   of	   gross	  
negligence	  manslaughter	  where	   the	   defendant	   had	   breached	   his	   duty	   of	   care	   and	  
that	  breach	  had	  caused	  the	  loss	  of	  life,	  provided	  that	  the	  breach	  amounted	  to	  gross	  
negligence.	  In	  making	  that	  determination,	  the	  jury	  would	  have	  to	  consider	  the	  extent	  
to	   which	   his	   conduct	   departed	   from	   the	   proper	   standard	   of	   care,	   given	   all	   the	  
circumstances	   in	  which	   he	   found	   himself	   at	   the	   time.	   In	  R	   v	  Misra	   and	   Srivastava	  
([2004]	   EWCA	   Crim	   2375),	   where	   a	   patient	   died	   when	   he	   was	   not	   treated	   for	   an	  
infection	   following	   routine	   knee	   surgery,	   the	   Court	   of	   appeal	   subsequently	  
determined	   that	   this	   test	   did	   not	   breach	   Article	   7	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   of	  
Human	  Rights	  (ECHR)	  for	  lack	  of	  certainty.	  	  
	  
The	   Irish	   courts	   have	   also	   considered	   cases	   of	   gross	   negligence	   manslaughter	  
resulting	   in	   deaths	   by	   actions	   or	   omissions.	   In	  DPP	   v	   Dunleavy	   ([1948]	   IR	   95),	   the	  
Court	   of	   Criminal	   Appeal	   laid	   down	   the	   test	   for	   gross	   negligence	  manslaughter.	   In	  
that	  case,	  a	  taxi	  driver	  killed	  a	  cyclist	  when	  he	  was	  driving	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  the	  
road	   with	   his	   headlights	   switched	   off	   at	   night.	   Davitt	   J	   in	   the	   Court	   of	   Criminal	  
Appeal,	   while	   noting	   that	   manslaughter	   by	   negligence	   is	   difficult	   to	   precisely	   and	  
concisely	   define	   for	   all	   circumstances,	   stated	   that	   the	   test	   is	  whether	   the	   accused	  
fails	  to	  observe	  standards	  thought	  objectively	  necessary	  in	  the	  circumstances,	  where	  
the	  negligent	  act	  results	  in	  death,	  and	  the	  fatal	  negligence	  was	  of	  a	  very	  high	  degree	  
involving	  the	  risk	  or	  likelihood	  of	  substantial	  personal	  injury	  to	  others.	  This	  test	  was	  
subsequently	   endorsed	   and	   applied	   in	   The	   People	   (DPP)	   v	   Cullagh	   (Unreported,	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Court	  of	  Criminal	  Appeal,	  15	  March	  1999),	  a	  case	  in	  which	  a	  child	  was	  killed	  when	  a	  
rusty	   cable	   holding	   a	   chairoplane	   at	   a	   funfair	   snapped.	  More	   recently,	   noting	   that	  
this	  offence	  was	  not	  unconstitutional	  for	  vagueness,	  Charleton	  J	  in	  Joel	  v	  DPP	  ([2012]	  
IEHC	  295)	   reiterated,	  “criminally	  negligent	  manslaughter	  arises	  where	   the	  death	  of	  
another	  person	  is	  caused	  in	  circumstances	  which	  objectively	  amount	  to	  a	  very	  high	  
degree	  of	  negligence	  and	  which,	  in	  the	  circumstances	  in	  question,	  to	  any	  reasonable	  
person	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   serious	   risk	  was	   unjustifiably	   taken	  with	   the	   life	   of	   another	  
would	  be	  apparent”.	  
	  
Despite	   a	   clearly	   articulated	   test	   for	   gross	   negligence	   manslaughter,	   there	   is	   no	  
record	  of	  a	  successful	  prosecution	  being	  taken	  against	  companies	  for	  this	  offence	  in	  
Ireland.	   Identifying	   this	   as	   a	   lacuna	   in	   the	   law,	   the	   Law	   Reform	   Commission	  
recommended	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   new	   statutory	   offence	   of	   corporate	  
manslaughter,	   based	   on	   the	   common	   law	   offence	   of	   manslaughter	   by	   gross	  
negligence,	   formulated	  around	  a	  breach	  of	  duty	  as	  set	  out	   in	  Dunleavy	   (LRC,	  2005:	  
15-­‐19).	  The	  offence	  would	  apply	  to	  all	  “undertakings”,	  where	  this	  means	  “a	  person	  
being	   a	   body	   corporate	   or	   an	   unincorporated	   body	   of	   persons	   engaged	   in	   the	  
production,	   supply	   or	   distribution	   of	   goods	   or,	   the	   provision	   of	   a	   service	  whether	  
carried	   on	   for	   profit	   or	   not”	   (116).	   It	   sets	   out	   a	   restructured	   version	   of	   the	  
identification	   doctrine	   to	   address	   the	   “paradox	   of	   size”,	   whereby	   the	   doctrine	  
operates	   to	   “disproportionately	   affect	   small	   organisations	   where	   the	   controlling	  
mind	   is	   easy	   to	   identify”	   (29).	   The	   actions	   of	   “high	   managerial	   agents”,	   including	  
directors,	  managers	  or	  other	  similar	  officers	  or	  persons	  who	  purport	  to	  act	  as	  such,	  
are	  considered	  in	  determining	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  a	  breach	  of	  duty	  but	  they	  do	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not	  have	   to	  be	   the	  directing	  mind	  and	  will	   of	   the	   corporation.	  The	   court	  may	  also	  
have	   regard	   to	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   factors,	   including	   the	   regulatory	   environment	   in	  
which	  the	  entity	  is	  operating.	  Companies	  convicted	  of	  this	  offence	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  
an	  unlimited	  fine,	  determined	  by	  the	  court.	  High	  managerial	  agents	  may	  be	  subject	  
to	   accessorial	   liability	   for	   “grossly	   negligent	   manslaughter	   causing	   death”	   if	   the	  
company	   has	   already	   been	   so	   convicted.	   These	   agents	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   an	  
unlimited	  fine,	  a	  period	  of	  disqualification	  as	  the	  court	  sees	  fit,	  and	  imprisonment	  of	  
up	  to	  12	  years.	  Though	  an	  attempt	  was	  made	  to	  pass	  a	  version	  of	  this	  Bill	   in	  2007,	  
this	  effort	   lapsed.	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  failure	  to	  pass	   legislation	   in	  this	  area,	  McGrath	  
(2015:	   117)	   observes,	   “this	   was	   a	   period	   of	   talk,	   inquiry,	   investigation	   and	  
consciousness-­‐raising	   but	   often	   not	   of	   action	   or	   change.	   The	   need	   to	   address	  
corporate	  wrongdoing	  was	  beginning	   to	  enter	   the	   consciousness	  of	   legislators	  and	  
citizens	  alike	  but	  the	  efforts	  to	  act	  on	  these	  sentiments	  lacked	  commitment”.	  	  
	  
By	   contrast,	   though	   its	   introduction	   was	   also	   significantly	   delayed,	   the	   Corporate	  
Manslaughter	  and	  Corporate	  Homicide	  Act	  was	  enacted	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  2007	  (Gobert,	  
2008a).	  Despite	  its	  title,	  however,	  the	  offence	  can	  be	  committed	  not	  only	  by	  public	  
and	   private	   companies,	   but	   also	   by	   unincorporated	   organisations,	   including	  
government	  departments	   and	  public	  bodies,	   as	   specified	   in	   Schedule	  1	   to	   the	  Act.	  
The	   legislation	   specifically	   provides	   that	   a	   duty	   of	   care	   is	   owed	   to	   anyone	  who	   is	  
detained	  at	  a	  “custodial	  institution”	  (CMCHA,	  s2(7)).	  Most	  of	  the	  legislation	  entered	  
into	  force	  on	  the	  6th	  of	  April	  2008	  though	  the	  custody	  provisions	  were	  not	  effective	  
until	   the	  1st	   of	   September	  2011	   to	   allow	   the	   relevant	  organisations	   to	  prepare	   for	  
their	  application	  (SI	  2011/1867).	  The	  Act	  abolishes	  the	  existing	  common	  law	  offence	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of	   gross	  negligence	  manslaughter	   for	   companies	  and	   though	   individuals	   cannot	  be	  
held	  liable	  under	  the	  Act,	  they	  remain	  subject	  to	  the	  common	  law	  on	  manslaughter	  
and	  health	  and	  safety	  law.	  Relevant	  organisations	  are	  guilty	  of	  the	  new	  offence,	  “if	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  its	  activities	  are	  managed	  or	  organised	  (a)	  causes	  a	  person’s	  death,	  
and	   (b)	   amounts	   to	   a	   gross	   breach	   of	   a	   relevant	   duty	   of	   care	   owed	   by	   the	  
organisation	  to	  the	  deceased”	  (CMCH	  Act	  sections	  1(1)(a)	  and	  1(1)(b)).	  By	  looking	  at	  
the	  organisation	  as	  a	  whole,	  rather	  than	  a	  particular	  layer	  of	  management,	  “the	  old	  
limitations	   of	   the	   identification	   doctrine	   are	   gone	   .	   .	   .	   It	   will	   now	   be	   possible	   to	  
examine	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  organisation	  to	  
prove	  a	  failure	  of	  management	  by	  the	  organisation	  .	  .	  .”	  (Ormerod	  and	  Taylor,	  2008:	  
602).	  However,	  the	  offence	  can	  be	  committed,	  “only	  if	  the	  way	  in	  which	  its	  activities	  
are	  managed	  or	  organised	  by	  its	  senior	  management	  is	  a	  substantial	  element	  in	  the	  
breach”	  (CMCH	  Act	  sections	  1(3)),	  a	  construction	  that	  does	  not	  make	  the	  actions	  of	  
the	   non-­‐senior	   managers	   irrelevant,	   provided	   they	   do	   not	   render	   the	   senior	  
managers	  actions	  less	  than	  substantial	  (Ormerod	  and	  Taylor,	  2008:	  604).	  The	  breach	  
is	  gross,	  “if	   the	  conduct	  alleged	  to	  amount	   to	  a	  breach	  of	   that	  duty	   falls	   far	  below	  
what	  can	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  of	  the	  organisation	   in	  the	  circumstances”	  (CMCH	  
Act	   section	   1(4)(b)).	   A	   person	   is	   involved	   in	   “senior	   management”	   if	   they	   “play	  
significant	  roles	  in	  (i)	  the	  making	  of	  decisions	  about	  how	  the	  whole	  or	  a	  substantial	  
part	  of	   its	  activities	  are	  to	  be	  managed	  or	  organised,	  or	   (ii)	   the	  actual	  managing	  or	  
organising	  of	  the	  whole	  or	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  those	  activities”	  (s.1(4)(c)).	  As	  such,	  
the	   legislation	   implements	   a	   “qualified	   aggregation	   principle”	   because	   it	  
characterises	  “the	  companies	  management	  failure	  as	  the	  aggregate	  of	  those	  (groups	  
of)	   individuals’	   failures;	   and	   (2)	   because	  whilst	   the	   failures	  might	   be	   found	   in	   and	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aggregated	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   places	   within	   the	   company,	   there	   is	   a	   proviso	   or	  
qualification	  that	  failures	  must	  include	  to	  an	  appropriate	  (substantial)	  extent,	  failure	  
or	   failures	   by	   senior	   management”	   (Ormerod	   and	   Taylor,	   2008:	   594-­‐595).	   The	  
mechanism	  for	  attributing	  liability	  is	  therefore	  broader	  than	  that	  of	  the	  identification	  
doctrine.	  An	  individual	  natural	  person,	  as	  a	  directing	  mind	  and	  will	  of	  the	  company,	  
does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  found	  criminally	  liable	  for	  the	  death	  in	  question	  in	  order	  for	  the	  
company	   to	   be	   held	   criminally	   responsible.	   The	   organisations	   can	   be	   punished	   by	  
unlimited	  fines,	  remedial	  orders	  and	  adverse	  publicity	  orders	  (CMCH	  Act,	  ss.1(6),	  9,	  
and	  10).	  
	  
The	  enforcement	  of	  the	  legislation	  has,	  however,	  been	  limited	  and	  uneven.	  Field	  and	  
Jones	   (2013:	   239-­‐246)	   note,	   “the	   Government’s	   Regulatory	   Impact	   Assessment	  
projected	  that	  the	  Act	  will	  not	  generate	  more	  than	  10	  to	  13	  successful	  prosecutions	  
per	   annum,	   despite	   the	   fact	   there	   are	   on	   average	   196	   workers	   per	   year	   fatally	  
injured	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom”.	   In	   fact,	   however,	  only	   six	   cases	  had	   concluded	  by	  
late	   2014	   and	   all	   offenders	   were	   small	   companies,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
legislation	  was	  designed	  to	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  prosecute	   large	  companies	  with	  more	  
complex	   organisational	   structures	   (Field	   and	   Jones,	   2014:	   158).	   Just	   one	   of	   these	  
involved	  the	  successful	  prosecution	  of	  a	  company	  for	  the	  death	  of	  a	  non-­‐worker	   in	  
circumstances	  where	  an	  eleven	  year	  old	  girl	  was	  struck	  by	  a	   ski-­‐boat	   (R.	  v	  Prince’s	  
Sporting	   Club	   Ltd	   Unreported	   November	   22,	   2013	   (Crown	   Ct	   (Southwark)).	  
Moreover,	   there	   was	   merely	   one	   trial	   (the	   other	   five	   corporate	   offenders	   had	  
pleaded	   guilty),	   suggesting	   that	   the	   State	   had	   pursued	   only	   the	  most	   obvious	   and	  
egregious	  cases.	   It	   seems	   likely	   that	   this	   is	  not	   for	  a	   lack	  of	  bad-­‐enough	  cases,	  but	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“the	   result	   of	   those	   with	   responsibility	   to	   investigate	   and	   prosecute	   lacking	   the	  
necessary	  resources,	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  training”	  (Slapper,	  2015:	  92).	  It	  has	  also	  been	  
suggested	  that	  “there	  has	  been	  a	  clear	  trade-­‐off	  between	  guilty	  pleas	  for	  the	  CMCH	  
charge	  and	  dropping	  those	  against	  individual	  directors	  (whether	  for	  manslaughter	  or	  
health	  and	  safety	  offences)”	  because	  those	  charges	  have	  been	  withdrawn	  when	  such	  
corporate	   guilty	   pleas	   were	   entered	   (Wells,	   2014:	   861).	   Moreover,	   the	   offenders	  
have	   been	   subjected	   to	   fines	   less	   than	   the	   £500,000	   minimum	   penalty	  
recommended	   by	   the	   Sentencing	   Guidelines	   Commission	   (Sentencing	   Guidelines	  
Council,	   2010:	   para.	   24).	   Accordingly,	   the	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   prosecutions	   for	  
corporate	   manslaughter	   remain	   overwhelming	   directed	   at	   small	   privately	   held	  
companies	  for	  the	  deaths	  of	  their	  employees.	  	  
	  
The	  Custody	  Provision	  (Section	  2(1)(d))	  
	  
The	   methodological	   deficiencies	   and	   technical	   complexities	   of	   the	   2007	   Act	   have	  
been	  well	  rehearsed,	  but	  the	  “most	  controversial	  category	  of	  duty”	  in	  the	  legislation	  
is,	   as	   Ormerod	   and	   Taylor	   (2008:	   600)	   note,	   “that	   relating	   to	   duties	   arising	   from	  
detention”.	   Yet	   the	   fact	   that	   scholars	   have	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   duty	   owed	   by	  
private	  companies	  to	  their	  employees,	  almost	  to	  the	  complete	  exclusion	  of	  the	  duty	  
owed	  by	  custodial	   institutions	  to	  those	  detained,	  has	  meant	  that	  the	  application	  of	  
the	   2007	   Act	   to	   the	   “ugly	   side	   of	   public	   service	   activity”	   has	   not	   been	   subject	   to	  
much	  academic	  scrutiny	  (Horder,	  2012:	  115).	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  prison	  
context	  where	  there	  has	  been	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  reports	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  
that	   have	   repeatedly	   offered	   evidence	   of	   inadequate	   screening	   and	   formal	   risk	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assessment,	   not	   to	   mention	   insufficient	   and	   inexperienced	   staffing,	   overcrowded	  
conditions	   and	   recurrent	   weaknesses	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Prison	   Service	  
suicide	  and	   self-­‐harm	  prevention	  procedures	   (ACCT)	   (PPO,	  2014a:	  5;	  HMCIP,	  2014:	  
29).	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  evidence	  −	  despite	  the	  effect	  of	  deaths	  in	  custody	  on	  both	  
the	  individuals	  and	  establishments	  involved	  (Liebling	  ,	  2002:	  201-­‐202)	  −	  that	  certain	  
prisons	   still	   fail	   to	   give	   sufficient	   attention	   to	   implementing	   and	   reinforcing	   the	  
recommendations	   of	   the	   Prisons	   and	   Probation	   Ombudsman,	   who	   investigates	   all	  
deaths	  in	  prison	  custody,	  in	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  procedural	  duty	  under	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  
ECHR	   (Owers,	   2009:	   1537).	   The	   “dangerous	   perpetuation	   of	   negligence,	   idleness,	  
indifference,	   inefficiency	   and	   the	   arbitrary	   cost-­‐cutting”	   does	   not,	   to	   use	   Horder’s	  
words,	  “only	  affect	  the	  safety	  of	  workers”	  (Horder,	  2012:	  116).	  	  
	  
The	   clamour	   to	   ensure	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   2007	  Act	   to	   the	   Prison	   Service	   and	  
other	  “carceral”	  spaces	  can,	  however,	  be	  only	  properly	  understood	  when	  one	  places	  
the	  number	  of	  custodial	  deaths	  in	  comparative	  perspective.	  For	  instance,	  there	  were	  
150	   deaths	   among	   British	  workers	   (almost	   all	   of	   which	   occurred	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	  
private	   corporate	   activity)	   between	   April	   2012	   and	   March	   2013	   (HSE,	   2015).	   By	  
contrast,	   there	  were	  182	  deaths	   in	  prison	  custody	   in	  the	  same	  period,	  51	  of	  which	  
were	  classified	  as	  “self-­‐inflicted”	  (Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  2014:	  7).	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  
prisoners	   in	   this	  period	  were	  more	   likely	   to	   take	   their	  own	   lives	   than	   construction	  
employees	  were	  to	  be	  killed	  at	  work	  (HSE,	  2015).	  However,	  these	  statistics	  disguise	  
the	   extent	   to	   which	   both	   workplace	   fatalities	   and	   self-­‐inflicted	   deaths	   in	   prison	  
custody	  are	  gendered.	  Although	  the	  rate	  of	  workplace	  fatality	  in	  Britain	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
lowest	   in	  Europe,	   there	  were	   still	   439	  deaths	  among	  Britain’s	  workers	   in	   the	   four-­‐
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year	  period	  between	  April	  2009	  and	  March	  2013	  and	  most	  of	   the	  victims	  of	  work-­‐
related	   fatal	  accidents	  were	  male.	  Similarly,	   there	  were	  313	  self-­‐inflicted	  deaths	   in	  
prison	  in	  the	  same	  period,	  of	  which	  9	  of	  the	  deceased	  were	  female.	  Thus,	  after	  the	  
sharp	   upward	   trend	   in	   prison	   suicides	   by	   females	   between	   1998	   and	   2003,	   the	  
number	  has	  declined	  in	  recent	  years.	  In	  2013,	  for	  instance,	  women	  represented	  4.6	  
per	  cent	  of	  the	  prison	  population	   in	  the	  UK	  and	  accounted	  for	  2.6	  per	  cent	  of	  self-­‐
inflicted	   deaths.	   This	   marked	   a	   notable	   decrease	   to	   the	   figures	   presented	   by	   the	  
Corston	  Report	  (2007),	  which	  was	  triggered	  by	  the	  self-­‐inflicted	  deaths	  of	  six	  women	  
at	   HMP	   Styal	   in	   a	   12-­‐month	   period	   between	   2002	   and	   2003.	   The	   2007	   report	  
highlighted	   that	   women	   represented	   only	   6	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   prison	   population	   in	  
2003,	  but	  that	  they	  accounted	  for	  15	  per	  cent	  of	  self-­‐inflicted	  deaths	  (Corston,	  2007:	  
19).	   In	   light	   of	   these	   figures,	   it	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   surmise	   that	   both	  workplace	  
deaths	  and	  prison	  suicides	  have	  become	  predominantly	  a	  male	  preserve	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  
recent	  years.	  	  	  
	  
That	   said,	   it	  would	   be	  misleading	   to	   suggest	   that	   all	   self-­‐inflicted	   deaths	   in	   prison	  
custody	  can	  be	  attributable	  to	  grossly	  negligent	  management	  practices	  or	  to	  grossly	  
negligent	  actions	  by	  prison	  staff,	  but	  it	  should	  also	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  a	  prisoner	  
is	  almost	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  the	  respective	  prison	  to	  safeguard	  his	  or	  her	  health	  
and	  safety	  during	  what	  may	  be	  a	  lengthy	  or	  an	  indeterminate	  sentence	  and	  that	  this	  
should	   supersede	   the	   “countervailing	   considerations	   and	   warrants	   of	   placing	   the	  
relevant	   organisation	   under	   an	   ongoing	   duty	   of	   care”	   (Horder,	   2012:	   137).	   This	  
argument	   was	   perfectly	   encapsulated	   by	   Lord	   Hunt	   (688	   HL	   Official	   Report	   (5th	  
Series),	  col	  GC	  187)	  who	  asserted	  that:	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The	  power	  lawfully	  to	  deprive	  an	  individual	  of	  his	  or	  her	  liberty	  must	  be	  one	  
of	  the	  most	  serious	  responsibilities	  there	  can	  be.	  The	  duty	  of	  care	  owed	  to	  an	  
individual	   in	   detention,	   where	   he	   cannot	   act	   freely	   in	   his	   own	   interests,	   is	  
onerous	  and	  profound.	  
	  
In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
ex	  parte	  Amin	  [2003]	  (UKHL	  51,	  para.	  21),	  the	  Zahid	  Mubarek	  case,	  was	  unanimous	  
in	  rejecting	  the	  Government’s	  argument,	  successful	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  that	  
“an	  allegation	  of	  negligence	  leading	  to	  death	  in	  custody,	  though	  grave	  enough	  in	  all	  
conscience,	  bears	  a	  different	  quality	  from	  a	  case	  where	   it	   is	  said	  that	  the	  state	  has	  
laid	  on	  lethal	  hands”	  and	  held	  that	  systemic	  failures	  leading	  to	  deaths	  called	  for	  even	  
greater	  scrutiny.	  Lord	  Bingham,	  for	   instance,	  said	  “a	  systemic	  failure	  to	  protect	  the	  
lives	   of	   persons	   detained	   in	   custody	   may	   well	   call	   for	   even	   more	   anxious	  
consideration	  and	  raise	  even	  more	  intractable	  problems”.	  	  
	  
So	  by	  virtue	  of	  schedule	  1,	  the	  offence	  of	  “Corporate	  Manslaughter”	  not	  only	  applies	  
to	   private	   companies	   but	   also	   in	   some	   measure	   to	   all	   “public	   bodies	   the	  
performance	  of	  whose	  functions	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  involve	  causing	  deaths”	  (Horder,	  
2012:	   117).	   These	   include,	   inter	   alia,	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Defence,	   the	   Department	   of	  
Health,	   and	   HMPS.	   Yet	   although	   the	   2007	   Act	   defines	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   duty,	   the	  
nature	  of	  the	  duty	  is	  simply	  described	  as	  the	  duty	  owed	  under	  the	  law	  of	  negligence	  
by	   the	  organisation	   to	  “someone	   for	  whose	  safety	   the	  organisation	   is	   responsible”	  
(CMCHA	  2007,	   s	   2(1)(d)).	   Although	   it	   is	  well	   established	   in	   the	   law	  of	   tort	   that	   an	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organisation	   responsible	   for	   the	  detention	  of	  a	  person	  owes	   that	  person	  a	  duty	   to	  
take	   reasonable	   care	   in	   respect	   of	   that	   person’s	   health	   and	   safety,	   conjecture	  
remains	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   exact	   extent	   to	   which	   that	   duty	   extends	   (Matthews,	  
2008:	  66).	  Thus	  far,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  judicial	  consideration	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  duty	  
of	   care	   to	  prevent	  prisoner	  deaths	  at	   the	  hands	  of	  other	  prisoners,	  but	   the	   courts	  
have	  held,	   in	  respect	  of	  self-­‐inflicted	  deaths,	   that	   the	  duty	  to	  take	  reasonable	  care	  
encompasses	  a	  duty	  to	  take	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  prevent	  a	  person	  from	  committing	  
suicide,	   but	   only	   where	   the	   custodians	   knew	   or	   ought	   to	   have	   known	   that	   the	  
individual	   prisoner	  was	   a	   suicide	   risk	   (66).	   	   The	  Court	   of	  Appeal	   in	  Orange	   v	   Chief	  
Constable	  of	  West	  Yorkshire	  Police	  ([2002]	  QB	  347:	  para.	  43)	  did	  state,	  however,	  that	  
given	   the	   increased	   risk	   of	   suicide	   among	   prisoners	   that	   there	   was	   an	   obligation,	  
within	   the	  custodian’s	  general	  duty	  of	  care	   for	   the	  prisoner’s	  health	  and	  safety,	   to	  
take	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  identify	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  prisoner	  presented	  a	  suicide	  risk.	  
These	  decisions	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  2007	  Act	  may	  only	  be	  applicable	  where	  the	  
prisoner	   was	   being	   monitored	   under	   the	   Prison	   Service	   suicide	   and	   self-­‐harm	  
prevention	   procedures	   (ACCT)	   at	   the	   time	   of	   their	   self-­‐inflicted	   death	   or	   where	  
appropriate	   measures	   had	   not	   been	   taken	   to	   identify	   the	   known	   risk	   factors	   or	  
“‘triggers”	  (PPO,	  2014b).	  
	  
What	   is	  more	  clear,	  however,	   is	   that	   the	  offence	   is	  only	   committed	   if	   the	  death	   is	  
caused	   by	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   custodial	   institution’s	   activities	   are	  managed	   and	  
organised	  by	  its	  senior	  management	  and	  this	  must	  be	  a	  “substantial	  element”	  in	  the	  
gross	   breach	   of	   a	   relevant	   duty	   of	   care	   to	   the	   deceased.	   The	   first	   limb	   of	   this	  
definition	  is,	  as	  Griffin	  and	  Moran	  (2010:	  370)	  observe,	  a	  “reflection	  of	  the	  common	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law	   ‘directing	   mind’	   test”,	   but	   the	   “second	   part	   of	   the	   definition	   removes	   any	  
requirement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  senior	  manager	  to	  possess	  a	  directing	  influence	  in	  the	  
organisation	   or	   management	   of	   a	   relevant	   organisation’s	   activities	   and	   policies”.	  	  
Accordingly,	   it	  would	  appear	   that	   the	   liability	  of	  a	  prison	  “may	  now	  ensue	  without	  
the	   necessity	   of	   establishing	   that	   a	   senior	   manager	   obeyed	   policy	   or	   instructions	  
dictated	   by	   the	   organisation’s	   directing	   mind”	   (370).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   prison	  
service	  could	  potentially	  be	  prosecuted	   for	  manslaughter	   if	   gross	   failures	  of	   senior	  
management	   cause	   the	   death	   of	   a	   detainee.	   Liability,	   however,	   appears	   to	   be	  
excluded	   where	   the	   death	   is	   due	   to	   a	   public	   policy	   decision	   not	   to	   allocate	  
appropriate	  resources	  to	  the	  Prison	  Service	  (CMCHA,	  s.	  3(1);	  Horder	  2012:	  131-­‐132).	  	  
	  
The	  common	  law	  identification	  principle	  is	  also	  reformed	  further	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  
that	   an	   organisation’s	   liability	   may	   now	   also	   be	  established	   by	   “aggregating	   the	  
cumulative	   conduct	   of	   a	   collective	   of	   senior	  managers”	   (Griffin	   and	  Moran,	   2010:	  
370).	   	  Although	   the	   concept	   of	   aggregation	   was	   rejected	   by	   the	   trial	   court	   in	   the	  
Herald	  case,	  the	  2007	  Act	  appears	  to	  accept	  aggregated	  fault	   in	  a	  limited	  form	  and	  
makes	   it	   possible	   to	   convict	   a	   prison	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   collective	   failings	   that	  must	  
include,	  but	  are	  not	  restricted	  to,	  failings	  on	  the	  part	  of	  senior	  managers.	  Take,	  for	  
example,	   the	   murder	   of	   Zahid	   Mubarek,	   who	   was	   killed	   by	   his	   cellmate,	   Robert	  
Stewart,	   at	   Feltham	  Young	  Offenders	   Institution	   (YOI)	   in	  March	  2000.	   Stewart	  had	  
been	   “manifesting	   extreme	   racist	   views	   in	   correspondence,	   and	   was	   diagnosed	  
during	   the	   criminal	   proceedings	   as	   a	   psychopath”	   (Keith,	   2006:	   6).	   On	   arrival	   at	  
Feltham,	  Stewart	  was	  placed	  in	  a	  cell	  with	  Mubarek,	  and	  brutally	  attacked	  him	  with	  a	  
wooden	  table	  leg.	  Had	  Feltham	  YOI	  been	  prosecuted	  for	  the	  death	  of	  Zahid	  Mubarek	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under	  the	  2007	  Act	  (had	  it	  been	  in	  force	  at	  the	  time)	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  
the	   case	   would	   have	   succeeded.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   subsequent	  
investigation	  into	  the	  murder	  conducted	  by	  the	  Committee	  for	  Racial	  Equality	  (2003:	  
162)	  are	  particularly	  noteworthy:	  
	  
Actions	  which	   should	   have	   protected	   Zahid	  were	   not	   taken	   because	   of	   the	  
interaction	   of	   a	   number	   of	   factors.	   The	   pressure	   of	   prisoner	   numbers,	   the	  
perception	  of	   staff	   shortages,	   limited	   resources	  and	  poor	  management	  had	  
created	  a	  climate	   in	  which	   indifference,	  negligence,	  corner-­‐cutting	  and	  non-­‐
compliance	   with	   specific	   and	   clear	   HM	   Prison	   Service	   requirements	   had	  
become	  the	  norm.	  
	  
S.8	  of	   the	  Act	  also	  stipulates	  that	   juries	  must	   consider	  any	  evidence	  that	  shows	  an	  
alleged	  breach	  of	  health	  and	  safety	  legislation.	  This	  may	  have	  particularly	  important	  
consequences	  in	  the	  prison	  context	  where	  the	  Health	  and	  Safety	  at	  Work	  Act	  1974	  is	  
largely	   inapplicable	   and	   cannot	  be	   invoked	  by	  prisoners	  who	   suffer	  breaches	  of	   it,	  
even	   though	   Standing	  Order	   6A	   (15)	   allows	   for	   prison	   inspections	   by	   the	  HSE	   and	  
HMPS	  has	  been	  censured	  four	  times	  since	  1999	  (Livingstone	  et	  al,	  2008:	  232).	  This	  is	  
also	   significant	   in	   that	   the	   Act	   states	   that	   should	   a	   violation	   of	   health	   and	   safety	  
legislation	   be	   established,	   juries	   are	   permitted	   to	   take	   into	   account	   whether	  
“attitudes,	   policies,	   systems	   or	   accepted	   practices	   within	   the	   organisation”	   were	  
likely	   to	   have	   encouraged	   any	   failure	   to	   meet	   safety	   standards	   or	   produced	   a	  
tolerance	  of	  it.	  Perhaps	  a	  crown	  censure	  would	  be	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  show	  HMPS	  
failed	  to	  comply	  with	  health	  and	  safety	  legislation,	  but	  as	  the	  dicta	  of	  Hooper	  J	  in	  the	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Mubarek	   case	   ([2003]	  UKHL	   51:	   para.	   26)	   indicates,	   evidence	   of	   a	   prison’s	   culture	  
and	  ethos	  may	  be	  decisive	  in	  certain	  cases	  involving	  deaths	  in	  custody:	  	  	  	  
	  
Zahid	   Mubarek	   was	   murdered	   in	   Feltham	   by	   a	   racist	   cell	   mate	   with	   ‘an	  
alarming	   and	   violent	   criminal	   record,	   both	   in	   and	   out	   of	   custody’.	   It	   is	  
accepted	  that	  Zahid	  Mubarek	  was	  put	  in	  the	  same	  cell	  as	  his	  killer	  because	  of	  
‘systemic	  failures’.	  Established	  procedures	  were	  not	  followed	  and	  there	  is	  an	  
appalling	   history	   at	   Feltham	   of	   failure	   to	   comply	   with	   earlier	  
recommendations.	   It	   seems	   likely	   (and	   it	   is	   certainly	   arguable)	   that	   there	  
were	  serious	  human	  failings	  both	  at	  the	  wing	  level	  and	  at	  higher	  levels	  which	  
have	  not	  been	  publicly	  identified.	  
	  
Yet	  despite	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  custodial	  provision,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  
“senior	   management”	   test	   renders	   section	   2(1)(d)	   somewhat	   ineffective,	   because	  
not	   only	   does	   it	   force	   “the	   inquiry	   back	   onto	   the	   issue	   of	   identifiable	   individuals”	  
(Ormerod	  and	  Taylor,	  2008:	  604),	  it	  also	  fails	  both	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  reality	  of	  how	  
the	   suicide	   prevention	   procedures	   work	   in	   UK	   prisons	   and	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  
organisational	  structure	  within	  HMPS.	  
	  
[Insert	  Figure	  1]	  
	  
There	  are	   three	   levels	  of	  management	   in	  HMPS	   since	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  new	  
Fair	  and	  Sustainable	  working	  structures	  on	  the	  1st	  April	  2013.	  The	  first-­‐tier	  definition	  
of	  senior	  management	  (in	  effect	  the	  “directing	  mind”	  of	  the	  prison)	  consists	  solely	  of	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the	  office	  of	  prison	  governor,	  while	  the	  second	  tier	  comprises	  Deputy	  Governors	  and	  
invariably	  Heads	  of	  Function.	  Although	  the	  Senior	  Management	  Team	  (SMT)	  within	  a	  
prison	   will	   be	   composed	   of	   members	   from	   both	   management	   tiers,	   proving	   a	  
prison’s	   liability	   based	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   “senior	  management”	   in	   the	   2007	   Act	  
may,	  in	  fact,	  “mirror	  the	  difficulties”	  associated	  with	  establishing	  the	  guilt	  of	  private	  
companies	  under	  the	  common	  law	  identification	  principle	  (Griffin	  and	  Moran,	  2010:	  
371).	   For	   instance,	   the	   actual	   management	   control	   of	   the	   procedures	   to	   prevent	  
deaths	  in	  prison	  custody	  are	  exercised	  in	  practice	  at	  a	  non-­‐managerial	  level	  and	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  envisage	  how	  a	  prison	  officer	  could	  meet	  the	  criteria	  specified	  in	  the	  Act	  
in	   terms	   of	   “senior	   management”.	   Furthermore,	   even	   in	   the	   occasional	   instances	  
where	   management	   is	   involved,	   it	   is	   at	   the	   level	   of	   first	   line	   or	   third-­‐tier	  
management	  and	  a	  custodial	  manager	  –	  a	  “uniformed	  role”	  –	  would	  certainly	  not	  be	  
classed	   as	   senior	   management	   within	   HMPS	   (NOMS,	   2012:	   8).	   Thus,	   in	   order	   to	  
enable	   the	   Crown	   Prosecution	   Service	   (CPS)	   to	   establish	   a	   prison’s	   liability	   for	   a	  
death	   in	   a	   custodial	   setting,	   a	   custodial	  manager	  would	  have	   to	  be	   identified	   as	   a	  
senior	  manager	  and	  involved	  in	  the	  suicide	  prevention	  process.	  This,	  of	  course,	  not	  
only	   appears	   “unduly	   restrictive”	   and	   “threatens	   to	   open	   the	   door	   to	   endless	  
argument	   in	   court	   as	   to	   whether	   certain	   persons	   do	   or	   do	   not	   constitute	   senior	  
managers”	   (Clarkson,	  2005:	  683);	   it	  would	  also	  mean	  completely	   ignoring	  both	   the	  
practical	  reality	  of	  the	  organisational	  hierarchy	  and	  the	  suicide	  prevention	  strategies	  
within	  HMPS.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   in	   its	   concentration	   on	   “senior	   management”,	   the	   Act	   fails	   to	   take	  
account	   of	   the	   individual	   failings	   of	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   individuals	   within	   the	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organisation.	   Various	   inquests,	   thematic	   reviews	   and	   Chief	   Coroner	   Reports	   to	  
Prevent	   Deaths	   (previously	   Rule	   43	   reports)	   reveal	   that	   a	   substantial	   number	   of	  
avoidable	  deaths	   in	   custody	   can	  be	  attributed	   to	   failures	  by	   lower	   ranking	   staff	   to	  
properly	  implement	  the	  correct	  policies	  and	  procedures	  where	  a	  prisoner	  has	  been	  
identified	  at	  risk.	  Of	  course,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  senior	  management	  must	  issue	  
rules	  and	  guidance	   to	   staff,	  both	  orally	  and	   in	  writing,	  and	   that	  weaknesses	   in	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  death	  avoidance	  procedures	  are	  at	  least	  partially	  attributable	  
to	  a	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  senior	  management	  to	  subject	  the	  processes	  to	  rigorous	  
checks,	  but	  it	  should	  also	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  any	  case	  of	  corporate	  manslaughter	  
must	  rest,	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  success,	  on	  proof	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  a	  duty	  of	  care	  on	  the	  
part	   of	   senior	   managers	   and	   that	   the	   senior	   management	   failure	   must	   be	   a	  
substantial	  element	  in	  the	  breach	  of	  that	  duty.	  The	  term	  “substantial	  element”	  is	  not	  
defined	   by	   the	   Act	   of	   2007	   but	   rather	   a	   question	   of	   fact	   for	   the	   jury	   who	   must	  
determine	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  causation	  whether	  the	  culpability	  of	  a	  senior	  manager	  was	  
more	  than	  minimal,	  “albeit	  not	  necessarily	  an	  absolute	  factor,	  in	  the	  breach	  of	  duty	  
resulting	   in	   the	   person’s	   death”	   (Griffin	   and	  Moran,	   2010:	   370).	   Therefore,	   other	  
than	   in	  an	  unusual	   situation	  where	  a	  death	   in	  prison	  was	  directly	  attributable	   to	  a	  
direction	   or	   instruction	   given	   by	   a	   Governor,	   a	   Deputy	   Governor	   or	   a	   Head	   of	  
Function	  (“something	  that	  is	  not	  usual	  during	  standard	  ACCT	  procedures”),	  it	  would	  
be	   very	   difficult	   for	   the	   CPS	   to	   establish	   a	   prison’s	   liability	   for	   the	   offence	   of	  
corporate	   manslaughter	   (PPO,	   2014a:	   19).	   Even	   where	   a	   custodial	   manager	   is	  
involved	   in	   the	  ACCT	  process,	   the	  difficulty	   in	   identifying	   a	   line	  manager	   as	   senior	  
management	  may	  nullify	  the	  intent	  of	  section	  2	  (1)(d)	  and	  undermine	  the	  capacity	  of	  
the	  Crown	  to	  successfully	  convict	  a	  prison	  for	  an	  avoidable	  death	  in	  custody.	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There	  are,	  of	  course,	  others	  aspects	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  in	  the	  2007	  statute	  as	  originally	  
enacted.	  Many	  of	  the	  criticisms	  made	  by	  legal	  scholars	  such	  as	  the	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  
organisational	   liability,	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   Act	   to	   such	   a	   diverse	   array	   of	  
organisations,	   the	   exemptions	   to	   police	   officers	   and	   army	   officials,	   and	   the	  
requirement	   of	   DPP	   consent	   to	   prosecute	   are	   persuasive	   and	   well	   founded.	   One	  
eminent	  legal	  scholar	  (Gobert,	  2008a:	  415),	  for	  instance,	  has	  argued	  that:	  
	  
.	   .	  .	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  bill	   in	  the	  final	  days	  before	  its	  passage	  to	  deaths	  in	  
custody	  means	  that	  prisons	  can	  be	  prosecuted	  when	  deaths	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  
of	   inadequate	   staff	   to	  provide	   comprehensive	   supervision	  of	   an	  undeniably	  
violent	  prisoner	  population,	  where	   the	   inability	   to	  hire	  more	   staff	   is	  due	   to	  
the	  budgetary	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  the	  government.	  
	  
This	   example,	   he	  observes,	   is	   not	   intended	   to	   suggest	   that	   “prisons	   should	  not	  be	  
held	   accountable	  when	   their	   gross	   negligence	   causes	   death”,	   or	   that	   all	   prisoners	  
who	   are	   willfully	   exposed	   to	   organisational	   gross	   negligence	   are	   not	   deserving	   of	  
protection,	  but	  rather	  that	  other	  more	  appropriate	  types	  of	  criminal	  legislation	  than	  
the	   law	   of	   corporate	   manslaughter	   might	   be	   constructed	   to	   cover	   these	   type	   of	  
situations	   (415-­‐416).	   	   The	   new	   approach	   also	   provokes	   the	   broader	   question	   of	  
whether	   it	   is	   the	   conviction	   of	   companies	   and	   public	   bodies	   that	   is	   the	   most	  
significant	  facet,	  or	  whether	  the	  punishment	  of	  organisations	  should	  be	  considered	  
as	   important	   too	   (Ashworth	   and	   Horder,	   2013:	   154).	   A	   custodial	   institution	   can	  
hardly	  be	  imprisoned,	  moderate	  fines	  can	  be	  swallowed	  up	  as	  operational	  costs,	  and	  
severe	  fines	  may	  result	  in	  further	  reductions	  in	  the	  number	  of	  prison	  officers	  which	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would	   inevitably	   have	   deleterious	   effects	   on	   the	   safety	   and	   welfare	   of	   inmates.	  
Finally,	  there	  is	  also	  some	  evidence,	  both	  in	  the	  corporate	  and	  the	  custodial	  context,	  
to	  suggest	  that	  perhaps	  that	  the	  Act	  should	  have	  been	  extended	  beyond	  the	  limited	  
(but	  high-­‐profile)	  area	  of	  homicide	  (Gobert,	  2008a:	  419-­‐422).	  Take,	  for	  instance,	  the	  
remarks	  of	  Lord	  Ramsbottom,	  when	  speaking	  of	  Wormwood	  Scrubs	  during	  a	  debate	  
on	   the	   Bill.	   	   Although	   observing	   that	   there	   was	   “no	   case	   of	   manslaughter”,	   he	  
recalled	  that	  “there	  was	  extraordinarily	  bad	  behaviour	  by	  staff,	  brutality	  of	  prisoners	  
and,	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  management	  failure	  on	  a	  scale	  that	  I	  simply	  could	  not	  
believe”	  (688	  HL	  Official	  Report	  (5th	  Series),	  col	  GC	  192).	  	  
	  
Writing	  in	  2008,	  James	  Gobert	  intimated	  that	  the	  symbolic	  significance	  of	  the	  2007	  
Act	  may	  “ultimately	  transcend	  its	  methodological	  deficiencies”	  and	  that	  the	  primary	  
value	  of	   the	  Act	  may	   very	  well	   lie	   in	   the	   very	   fact	   of	   its	   existence	   (2008a:	   413).	   If	  
nothing	  else,	  it	  was	  anticipated	  that	  the	  Act	  would,	  at	  least,	  spur	  the	  prison	  service	  
and	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  custodial	  institutions	  to	  satisfy	  themselves	  that	  the	  structures	  
and	  systems	  for	  preventing	  deaths	  in	  custody	  were	  fit	  for	  purpose	  and	  coerce	  them	  
to	  take	  a	  fresh	  look	  at	  their	  culture	  and	  ethos	  in	  this	  regard	  (425-­‐32).	  Furthermore,	  it	  
was	  envisaged	  that	  the	  S.	  2(1)(d)	  duty	  would	  encourage	  the	  Prison	  Service	  to	  afford	  
greater	  compliance	  with	  safer	  custody	  practices	  as	  embodied	  in	  PSI	  64/2011	  and	  the	  
ACCT	  document	  (v.5).	  As	  Lord	  Ramsbottom	  (688	  HL	  Official	  Report	  (5th	  Series),	  col	  GC	  
193)	  put	  it:	  	  
	  
I	  hate	  the	  thought	  of	  coercion	  through	  a	  Bill,	  but	  this	  Bill,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  
the	   duty	   of	   care	   and	  which	   should	   be	   shown	   to	   everyone	   in	   the	   charge	   of	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these	  authorities,	   is	  an	  appropriate	  weapon.	   I	   seriously	  believe	   that	   the	  Bill	  
would	   energise	   the	  management	   system	   in	   a	   way	   that	   nothing	   else	   that	   I	  
have	  come	  across	  in	  the	  past	  10	  years	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  able	  to.	  
	  
Yet	  despite	  such	  optimistic	  pronouncements,	   there	  were	  more	  self-­‐inflicted	  deaths	  
in	   prison	   custody	   in	   2014	   than	   at	   any	   time	   in	   the	   last	   10	   years	   (“reversing	   a	  
downturn	   in	   the	   previous	   decade”)	   (HMCIP,	   2014:	   25),	   the	   Prison	   and	   Probation	  
Ombudsman	  has	  called	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  Safer	  Custody	  strategy	  and	  ACCT	  to	  see	  if	  
they	  are	  still	   fit	   for	  purpose	  and	  the	  Corporate	  Manslaughter	  Act	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  
invoked	   for	   a	   single	   death	   in	   prison	   custody	   (PPO,	   2014a:	   5).	   What	   is	   more,	   it	  
appears	   that	   even	   if	   proceedings	   were	   instituted	   against	   a	   prison	   for	   a	   death	   in	  
custody	   judicial	   interpretation	   of	   S.	   2(1)(d),	   and	   more	   particularly	   the	   senior	  
management	  test,	  may	  prove	  evidentially	  problematic.	  Although	  the	  management	  of	  
a	   prison	  will	   ultimately	   fall	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	   the	   SMT,	   the	  death	   avoidance	   and	  
ACCT	  procedures	  are	  implemented,	  at	  best,	  at	  line	  management	  level	  and	  invariably	  
at	   a	   non-­‐managerial	   level.	   While	   it	   may	   be	   a	   rational	   supposition	   for	   a	   jury,	   in	  
determining	   the	   liability	   of	   a	   prison,	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   responsibility	   for	   the	  
breach	  of	  a	   relevant	  duty	  should	   logically	  be	  attributed	  to	  members	  of	   the	  SMT,	   it	  
should	   be	   borne	   in	   mind	   that	   an	   ability	   to	   deflect	   liability	   exists	   in	   any	   large	  
organisation	   that	   is	   characterised	   by	   a	   system	   of	   complex	   management	   and	  
operational	   structures	   (Griffin	   and	   Moran,	   2010:	   371).	   Of	   course,	   the	   ability	   to	  
deflect	  responsibility	  has	  always	  been,	  and	  still	  appears	  to	  be	  at	   least	   in	  the	  prison	  
context,	   a	  major	   limitation	  on	   liability,	   and	   like	   its	  predecessor	   the	   “identification”	  
principle	  did	  with	  medium-­‐to	  large-­‐size	  corporate	  bodies,	  it	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	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that	  crucial	  strategic	  and	  more	  importantly,	  operational	  decisions,	  are	  frequently	  not	  
only	   delegated	   but	   assigned	   to	   lower	   levels	   of	   management	   and	   operations	   than	  
those	  granted	  policy	  authority	  over	  the	  prison’s	  affairs	  (371).	  Both	  independent	  and	  
anecdotal	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  this	   is	  certainly	  the	  case	  with	  Safer	  Custody.	   It	   is,	  
nonetheless,	   unacceptable	   that	   a	   prison	   could	   be	   able	   to	   escape	   liability	   for	   a	  
completely	   avoidable	   death	   in	   custody,	   especially	   when	   the	   fault	   element	   for	   the	  
crime	  was	  possessed	  by	  a	  custodial	  manager	  or	  a	  prison	  officer	  who	  had	  authority	  to	  





This	  chapter	  analysed	  the	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  criminalising	  the	  predominantly	  
male	  phenomena	  of	  culpable	  workplace	  fatalities	  in	  both	  Britain	  and	  Ireland.	  It	  was	  
shown	   that	   proving	   the	   directing	   mind	   of	   the	   organisation	   responsible	   for	   the	  
manslaughter,	  as	  a	  precondition	  to	  corporate	  criminal	  liability,	  was	  often	  too	  difficult	  
an	   obstacle	   to	   surmount	   when	   prosecuting	   large	   companies	   with	   complex	  
management	  systems.	  The	  attribution	  doctrine,	  which	  did	  not	  require	  the	  directing	  
mind	  to	  be	  culpable	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  criminal	   liability,	  offered	  greater	   flexibility	  
for	  prosecutors	   seeking	   to	   impose	   liability	  but	   it	  also	  suffered	   from	  vagueness	  and	  
has	  been	  disfavoured	  as	  a	  means	  of	  imposing	  criminal	  responsibility	  in	  recent	  times.	  
Although	   the	   proposed	   corporate	   manslaughter	   legislation	   in	   Ireland	   appears	   to	  
have	   stalled	   indefinitely,	   the	   CMCH	   Act	   2007	   in	   the	   UK	   has	   embraced	   another	  
method	  of	  attributing	  culpable	  misconduct	  to	  organisations.	  It	  adopted	  a	  “qualified	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aggregation”	  test,	  whereby	  an	  organisation	  may	  be	  guilty	  of	  corporate	  manslaughter	  
when	  individual	  failures	  can	  cumulatively	  constitute	  corporate	  failure,	  provided	  that	  
senior	  management	  failures	  were	  a	  substantial	  element	  in	  the	  breach	  of	  duty	  owed	  
to	   the	  deceased.	  Nevertheless,	   though	   the	   legislation	  extended	  criminal	   liability	   to	  
all	   relevant	  public	  bodies	  that	  cause	  death,	  not	   just	  companies,	   the	   legislation	  has,	  
thus	   far,	   been	   enforced	   primarily	   against	   small	   private	   companies	   for	   employee	  
fatalities	   in	  the	  workplace.	  The	  CPS	  has	  yet	  to	  target	  HMPS	  for	  a	  death	   in	  custody,	  
even	   though	   more	   deaths	   occur	   annually	   in	   prisons	   than	   in	   the	   workplace.	  
Moreover,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   relegate	   this	   failing	   to	   the	   past.	   This	   chapter	   has	  
demonstrated	  that	  it	  may	  prove	  extraordinarily	  difficult	  to	  subject	  HMPS	  to	  criminal	  
liability	   in	   the	   future,	   even	   where	   there	   is	   a	   willingness	   to	   initiate	   proceedings,	  
because	   the	   legislation	   imposes	   a	   requirement	   that	   the	   actions	   of	   senior	  
management	  must	  have	  played	  a	  substantial	  role	   in	  the	  breach	  of	  duty	  resulting	   in	  
death.	   This	   is	   compounded	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   procedures	   to	   prevent	   deaths	   in	  
prison	  custody	  are	  invariably	  exercised	  by	  uniformed	  officers	  who	  play	  no	  role	  in	  the	  
management	  of	  the	  prison.	  	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   difficulties	   of	   securing	   convictions	   in	   practice,	   there	   is	   also	   the	  
difficulty	   as	   to	   what	   punishments	   the	   State	   should	   impose	   on	   this	   kind	   of	   public	  
body.	  The	  trite	  observation	  that	  convicted	  organisations	  have	  “no	  body	  to	  kick	  and	  
no	   soul	   to	   damn”	   seems	   particularly	   ironic	   given	   that	   HMPS	   can	   hardly	   be	  
imprisoned.	  Furthermore,	  it	  appears	  futile	  to	  fine	  a	  state-­‐funded	  public	  body	  such	  as	  
a	  prison,	  especially	  when	  this	  may	  reduce	  the	  resources	  it	  has	  available	  to	  safeguard	  
the	  welfare	  and	  safety	  of	  prisoners	  and	  when	  the	  costs	  of	  such	  fines	  inevitably	  “spill-­‐
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over”	   onto	   the	   taxpayer.	   The	   “spill-­‐over”	   effect	   of	   punishment	   in	  more	   traditional	  
corporate	  contexts	  has	  been	  well	  canvassed	  with	  the	  literature	  noting	  that	  the	  fining	  
of	   corporations	   may	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   affect	   innocent	   parties	   removed	   from	   the	  
wrongdoing	  than	  to	  punish	  management	  who	  are	  directly	  responsible	  for	  the	  crimes.	  
Indeed,	   it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	   the	  costs	  of	   such	   fines	  are	   imposed	  on	  employees	  
who	   suffer	   layoffs,	   consumers	   who	   are	   charged	   higher	   prices	   for	   products,	   and	  
shareholders	   who	   do	   not	   receive	   dividends	   (Coffee,	   1981;	   Fisse	   and	   Braithwaite,	  
1993).	  Yet,	   in	  terms	  of	  allocating	  responsibility,	  perhaps	  fining	  public	  bodies	  makes	  
more	  sense	   than	   fining	  private	  companies.	  Politicians	   representing	   the	  concerns	  of	  
taxpayers	  can	  put	  enormous	  pressure	  on	  prisons	  to	  reduce	  costs,	  without	  expressly	  
encouraging	   illegal	   or	   unsafe	   actions,	   but	   without	   sufficiently	   resourcing	   these	  
institutions	   to	   allow	   them	   to	  maintain	   safe	   conditions	   either.	   Imprisonment	   is	   the	  
state’s	   most	   powerful	   weapon	   of	   censure,	   designed	   to	   punish	   the	   most	  
reprehensible	   of	   shared	   wrongs	   against	   the	   community,	   to	   reinforce	   the	   shared	  
morality	   of	   that	   community	   (Marshall	   and	   Duff,	   1998;	   Durkheim,	   1964).	   The	  
community	   is	   imposing	   the	   custodial	   sentence	   through	   the	   courts	  and	   thus	   it	   is	   at	  
least	  arguable	  that	  the	  community	  should	  share	  the	  burden	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  
conditions	  in	  which	  prisoners	  are	  detained	  too.	  	  
	  
Yet	  wherever	   responsibility	   is	   attributed,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   avoid	   the	   conclusion	   that	  
the	   criminal	   law	   −	   while	   necessary	   for	   holding	   corporations	   and	   public	   bodies	  
criminally	  responsible	  when	  their	  gross	  negligence	  causes	  death	  −	  would	  have	  to	  be	  
used	  much	  more	  extensively	  than	   it	   is	  at	  present	  to	  produce	  the	   level	  of	  deterrent	  
effect	  required	  to	  prevent	  workplace	  fatalities	  or	  indeed	  deaths	  in	  custody	  (Almond,	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2013:	  178).	  Although	  the	  law	  of	  corporate	  manslaughter	  may	  serve	  a	  dynamic	  social	  
purpose	  by	  leading	  corporations	  and	  public	  bodies	  on	  the	  values	  that	  should	  inform	  
certain	  kinds	  of	  individual,	  collective	  and	  organisational	  behaviour,	  criminalisation	  is	  
insufficient	   to	  bring	  about	   fundamental	   change	  on	   its	  own.	  Perhaps	   it	  will	   only	  be	  
when	  work-­‐related	  fatalities	  and	  deaths	  in	  custody	  are	  recognised	  as	  pressing	  public	  
health	   issues	  that	   feasible	  prevention	  strategies	  will	  emerge	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  
of	   avoidable	   deaths	   both	   in	   custody	   and	   in	   the	   workplace	   (Simon,	   2010;	   Bonner,	  
2000:	   374;	   Herber	   and	   Landrigan,	   2005:	   541-­‐545).	   Politicians,	   legislators	   and	  
members	   of	   the	   public,	   who	   rarely	   respond	   sympathetically	   to	   calls	   for	   prisoners’	  
rights,	  may	  respond	  more	  enthusiastically	   if	  such	  problems	  are	  reconfigured	   in	  this	  
way.	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Table	  1:	  Standardised	  Incidence	  Rates	  of	  Fatal	  Accidents	  at	  Work	  in	  the	  EU15	  
Countries,	  2012.	  	  	  






United	  Kingdom	   0.58	  (85)	   0.88	  (83)	   2	  (0.05)	  
Netherlands	   0.72	  (26)	   1.09	  (26)	   0.0	  (0)	  
Sweden	   0.8	  (21)	   1.12	  (20)	   0.18	  (1)	  
Germany	   0.9	  (258)	   1.45	  (247)	   0.1	  (11)	  
Denmark	   1.18	  (20)	   1.85	  (20)	   0.0	  (0)	  
Greece	   1.2	  (18)	   1.88	  (18)	   0.0	  (0)	  
Italy	   1.29	  (237)	   1.98	  (233)	   0.07	  (4)	  
Ireland	   1.43	  (18)	   2.19	  (18)	   0.0	  (0)	  
Belgium	   1.46	  (30)	   2.27	  (30)	   0.0	  (0)	  
Finland	   1.62	  (23)	   2.55	  (22)	   0.13	  (1)	  
Spain	   1.99	  (168)	   3.18	  (165)	   0.1	  (3)	  
Austria	   2.37	  (51)	   3.91	  (51)	   0.0	  (0)	  
France	   2.64	  (350)	   4.05	  (328)	   0.4	  (22)	  
Portugal	   2.71	  (91)	   4.36	  (88)	   0.28	  (3)	  
Luxembourg	   2.91	  (6)	   4.57	  (6)	   0.0	  (0)	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Non-­‐Managerial	  Grades	  
Figure	  1:	  HMPS	  Organisational	  Structure	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Fair	  and	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